By contrast, Hamas, which seeks the elimination of Israel and the emergence of an Islamic state, does not have any interest in stopping the violence. Iran, which seeks the elimination of Israel and the spread of Shia Islam, does not have any interest in stopping the violence. Therefore both extremist parties must be marginalized for the peace process to continue. Implicitly, everyone present recognizes that assumption.
We have interests and our interests were well-served by bringing together these disparate groups together. If the Saudis, who have been bankrolling international terrorism, can be present at a historic, high-level contact, there might be a chance for peace after all.
Let’s deconstruct Haley’s argument, though.
He writes that the Bush Administration’s effort to isolate Hezbollah and Hamas will ultimately fail because it ignores the growing ties between Lebanon, Palestine, and Iran. How he makes the claim that there is growing support for Iran in Palestine and Lebanon is not made clear. Perhaps that’s because in Lebanon, at least, there isn’t much support at all.
If it were true that Lebanon so loves Teheran, how can Haley explain the assassinations of Rafik Hariri at the hands of Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah? Hariri was popular and Professor Haley mistakes the national Stockholm syndrome in Lebanon as some type of support for Iran at his own peril.
While it’s true that many Lebanese demonstrated in support of Hezbollah in the War of 2006, many did so because they were threatened by the state-like Hezbollah, whose Iranian-funded tentacles, provide schools and hospitals only to those that attend the rallies. This is coercion, not support.
Hezbollah, which used human-shields during the war, prohibited the Lebanese from fleeing at the barrel of a gun. They also, with the help of Syria, assassinated four anti-Syrian politicians. The recent sham election of Michel Suleiman indicates the power of fear within the Lebanese parliament, not a resounding love of Iran.
Similarly, Iran’s denial of the Holocaust and funneling of money to Hamas and other terrorist groups through intermediaries is not necessarily a win for Iran over the Palestinian people. Indeed, as we’ve seen in the past, Hamas will take money from anyone that will provide it. That some Palestinians like Hezbollah and by proxy, Iran, for the War in 2006 is not indicative of some growing support for Hezbollah. The Palestinians in Gaza in particular have concluded that the enemy of their enemy is their friend. But this calculus will ebb when Iran provides little in the way of real services.
Annapolis was never about making Iran cooperate in the peace process. What it was about was bringing the Palestinians and the other Arab nations together to talk about Israel and the future Palestine. If the Palestinian Authority pledges to end terrorism and Israel can stop the Gaza strip from getting access to Iranian weapons, then whether or not Iran supports the peace developments are irrelevant. Iran can play the role of “wicked fairy” all it wants. It isn’t going to change anything on the ground.
As Ambassador Kurtzer mentioned, this effort to isolate Iran has been somewhat successful. Syria, weary of the growing Iranian influence, may be prepared to make peace with Israel over the Golan Heights and Lebanon. That peace will also serve to isolate Iran.
On a final point, Professor Haley suggests that the Israeli "politicians intend to seize large parts of the West Bank and call it peace" because Israel's "system of proportional representation paralyzes diplomacy by handing control over major initiatives to the most militant and narrow members of its perennial coalitions" . How he can make such an accusation is news to me. Israel has repeatedly offered the Palestinians 97% of the West Bank in exchange for peace.
This claim has no basis in fact. I challenge Professor Haley to provide any evidence for it. For starters, virtually every single Israeli government has supported a dismantling of the settlements with the reassurance that the Palestine Authority will end terrorism.